Empirical evidence on horizontal competition in tax enforcement [WP-IEB] by Durán Cabré, José María et al.
 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON HORIZONTAL COMPETITION IN TAX 
ENFORCEMENT  
José María Durán-Cabré, Alejandro Esteller-Moré, Luca Salvadori 
Document de treball de l’IEB 2012/5 
 Fiscal Federalism 
 
 
 
Documents de Treball de l’IEB 2012/5 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON HORIZONTAL  
COMPETITION IN TAX ENFORCEMENT 
 
 
José María Durán-Cabré, Alejandro Esteller-Moré, Luca Salvadori 
 
 
 
 
The IEB research program in Fiscal Federalism aims at promoting research in the public 
finance issues that arise in decentralized countries. Special emphasis is put on applied 
research and on work that tries to shed light on policy-design issues. Research that is 
particularly policy-relevant from a Spanish perspective is given special consideration. 
Disseminating research findings to a broader audience is also an aim of the program. The 
program enjoys the support from the IEB-Foundation and the IEB-UB Chair in Fiscal 
Federalism funded by Fundación ICO, Instituto de Estudios Fiscales and Institut d’Estudis 
Autonòmics. 
 
The Barcelona Institute of Economics (IEB) is a research centre at the University of 
Barcelona which specializes in the field of applied economics. Through the IEB-
Foundation, several private institutions (Applus, Abertis, Ajuntament de Barcelona, 
Diputació de Barcelona, Gas Natural and La Caixa) support several research programs. 
 
 
Postal Address: 
Institut d’Economia de Barcelona 
Facultat d’Economia i Empresa 
Universitat de Barcelona 
C/ Tinent Coronel Valenzuela, 1-11 
(08034) Barcelona, Spain 
Tel.: + 34 93 403 46 46 
Fax: + 34 93 403 98 32 
ieb@ub.edu 
http://www.ieb.ub.edu 
 
 
The IEB working papers represent ongoing research that is circulated to encourage 
discussion and has not undergone a peer review process. Any opinions expressed here are 
those of the author(s) and not those of IEB. 
 
 
 
Documents de Treball de l’IEB 2012/5 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON HORIZONTAL  
COMPETITION IN TAX ENFORCEMENT * 
 
 
José María Durán-Cabré, Alejandro Esteller-Moré, Luca Salvadori 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT:  Tax auditing parameters have been largely overlooked by the literature as 
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elements of the tax burden. In this paper we show that, in a federal framework, tax auditing 
policies can serve as additional tools for regional interaction. We examine the presence of this 
interaction by adopting a spatial econometric approach. We employ a time-space recursive 
model that accounts for sluggish adjustment in auditing policies and obtain results that are 
congruent with standard theory, corroborating the presence of horizontal competition between 
regions in their tax auditing policies. We also find that once regional governments acquire legal 
power, the opaque competition in enforcement policies disappears apparently switching to a 
more transparent competition in statutory tax parameters. 
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1. Introduction 
Enforcement strategies are crucial elements in the tax management process since they help  
determine the level and distribution of effective tax rates (e.g. Johns & Slemrod, 2010; Traxler, 
2011) and, hence, the total amount of tax revenues collected. Moreover, these strategies are of 
particular interest to federal countries, as auditing policies can represent a second, additional, 
tax instrument in the hands of sub-central authorities (Besfamille et al., 2012) – along with the 
setting of statutory tax rates – on which they can interact. Yet, the possibility of tax enforcement 
interdependence has received limited attention in the literature (with notable exceptions being 
Janeba & Peters, 1999; Cremer & Gahvari, 2000 and, Stöwhase & Traxler, 2005) and, to the 
best of our knowledge, there are no empirical studies investigating the presence of these 
interactions, which might be due to an absence of data on auditing policies and/or the 
difficulties in finding an adequate measure to represent the level of “tax enforcement”.  
 
We aim to fill this gap in the literature by analyzing the presence of horizontal tax 
interdependence between sub-central administrations in a federal context. In Spain, regional 
governments, the so-called “Comunidades Autónomas” (henceforth CAs), have had the power 
to administer several wealth taxes since the mid-eighties, first without any legal authority to 
modify the rule, though following reforms in 1997 and 2002 they did obtain the legislative 
power to modify significant tax parameters1. Here, we focus specifically on the Inheritance and 
Gift Tax (IGT), the main decentralized tax on wealth, which has recently become the subject of 
considerable debate both in Spain and in other countries2. There is evidence that the 
decentralization of the IGT in federal countries can induce a race to the bottom in statutory tax 
parameters (see, for example, Bird, 1991, Conway & Rork, 2004; Brülhart & Parchet, 2011)3.  
The origin of this process is the mobility of tax bases4. A similar effect has been documented for 
the Spanish case (see Durán-Cabré & Esteller-Moré 2010; López Casasnovas & Durán-Sindreu, 
2008), provoking an academic and a more general debate. The Spanish press headlines on these 
                                                     
1
 More specifically, following the 1997 reform, CAs were permitted to modify their tax rate schedules in 
line with national schedules. Following the 2002 reform, CAs were granted complete legislative control 
over the tax rates ceded to them by the central government. For a description of the current institutional 
organization of the Spanish tax administration see Esteller-Moré, 2008. 
2
 Taxing wealth and wealth transfers is generally unpopular and has become the subject of debate in 
several OECD countries, including United States and Canada. In Europe, the UK case is highly 
illustrative: the IGT is popularly ostracized because it raises relatively little revenue, but it is 
characterized by an excessively high flat rate (40%). Likewise, it raises issues about double taxation as 
well as about the absence of effects on wealth distribution (Boadway et al., 2010). 
3
 Recently, the European Commission has shown interest in such issues and even though they might arise 
under different circumstances – cross-border discrimination and double taxation, it would seem to 
confirm that questions surrounding the inheritance tax are of growing concern to European citizens 
(European Commission, 2011). 
4
 In a decentralized framework, when the principle of residence is applied, an individual finds it profitable 
to move his fiscal residence to the region with the lowest IGT rate so as to reduce the bequest tax burden. 
2
issues are symptomatic: “Cheaper Gifts and Inheritances”; “Regional Tax Competition”; “The 
Fiscal War among Regions Threatens the IGT”; “Regional Taxation and Voting with Feet”5. 
These articles corroborate the presence of mobility-based competition in the regional IGT 
statutory tax parameters. Similarly, we hypothesize that the same type of competition between 
regions occurred even before the decentralization of legal power, in the form of opaque 
competition on tax enforcement since it is the effective tax rate that conditions mobility. 
 
The objective of our paper, therefore, is to determine the form and degree of interaction between 
decentralized administrations when setting their policies. To achieve this, we develop a model 
of horizontal competition on the auditing rate, and empirically test its findings. The results of 
the theoretical framework are in line with the literature on tax rate competition: the mobility 
threat tames the revenue maximizing administrations that compete in a race to the bottom over 
their tax instrument so as not to lose their tax bases. We derive the slope of the administration’s 
reaction function and obtain a positive sign. We proceed to test this result using a spatial 
econometric approach. We estimate a time-space recursive model to account for possible 
sluggish adjustments in the setting of auditing policies (see Anselin et al., 2008). Our results 
corroborate the presence of horizontal interdependence between the regions and generate 
credible results that are coherent with the tax competition model. Moreover, we obtain an 
additional result: following the decentralization of legislative power on statutory tax parameters 
we observe a disappearance of competition in enforcement policies at the regional level. It 
seems that a substitution of instruments occurs with positive implications at the normative level: 
somewhat paradoxically in this perspective the tax decentralization process seems welcome 
since an opaque source of tax competition is substituted by a transparent source. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide a summary of the 
relevant literature, then the theoretical framework is developed and the empirical analysis 
performed. Finally, we conclude. 
 
2. Relevant Literature 
This study is closely related to the vast literature on taxation policy interactions between 
governments and, in particular, to that research line that deals with horizontal tax competition 
(see Brennan & Buchanan, 1980; Zodrow & Mieszkosky, 1986; and Wilson, 1986). This 
approach analyzes a decentralized framework in which local governments compete in a race to 
the bottom when fixing tax rates in order to gain or, at least not to lose, their tax bases. The 
                                                     
5
 The articles quoted are ABC (2008); El Periódico (2007); El País (2007) and Expansión (2011). Among 
other articles see El Mundo (2007); El País (2006); El Periódico (2007a) and Expansión (2007). 
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mobility or simply the threat of mobility of capital and people reduces government discretion to 
set tax rates at an optimal level with the effect of tax revenue cuts6.  
 
This literature has offered limited attention to enforcement policies although they represent 
critical elements in the tax management process. The most relevant theoretical contribution in 
this sense is that of Cremer & Gahvari (2000). Using a welfare maximizing framework, they 
examine the implications of tax evasion for fiscal competition and tax harmonization policies in 
an economic union. The countries have the power to set both tax rates and tax auditing policies. 
In a closed economy framework, allowing for tax evasion increases the marginal cost of public 
funds and reduces the level of public good provision. From our perspective the most interesting 
result of the paper concerns the economic union of two tax-evading countries. In this setting, the 
states engage in mobility-based competition that produces less than optimal equilibrium values 
of both tax and audit rates. Harmonization policies can theoretically circumvent this problem 
but, according to the authors, coordinating audit strategies may be problematic because it is 
difficult for the government of one country to observe and verify the enforcement efforts of the 
other. For this reason, although a harmonization policy on tax rates is effective in circumventing 
tax rate sub-optimality, it is not sufficient for avoiding the inefficient outcome of the auditing 
rate: since member states are no longer allowed to compete over tax rates, they lower their 
effective rates by cutting their auditing probabilities. 
 
A further contribution to this literature is provided by Stöwhase & Traxler (2005) who analyze 
the implications of different equalization systems on regional enforcement policies in a federal 
framework taking the statutory tax rates as being exogenously fixed at the central level. The 
benchmark framework presents no equalization scheme and is congruent with the results of 
Cremer & Gahvari (2000). Their most interesting result suggests that one way of partially 
circumventing the inefficient outcome of enforcement is to use a particular equalization scheme. 
By introducing a gross revenue sharing scheme, under which tax revenues are shared but 
auditing costs are borne fully by each region, an even more inefficient enforcement policy 
outcome is obtained. By considering instead a net revenue sharing scheme, under which both 
tax revenues and auditing costs are shared, the outcome is more efficient than both under the 
benchmark and the gross revenue sharing schemes. 
                                                     
6
 The applied literature that tests these theoretical models from an empirical point of view is vast and 
takes a spatial econometric approach. Among others, see for example: Figlio et al. (1999) that deal with 
simultaneous welfare benefits setting for the U.S. case; Rork (2003) that analyzes the competition in five 
different type of taxes (i.e. Taxes on Cigarette, Gasoline, Personal Income, General Sales and Corporate 
Income) for the U.S. case; Devereux et al. (2006) that focus on excise taxes, again for the U.S. case, 
Devereux et al. (2008) and Overesch & Rincke (2011) that concentrate on corporate taxes respectively for 
the U.S. and the European case. 
4
Janeba & Peters (1999) analyze the taxation of interest income in an economic union of two 
countries in the presence of tax evasion. In their setting, the enforcement effort is proxied by the 
treatment of the nonresidents’ tax base. In fact, any state can decide whether to discriminate 
against the mobile tax base when setting the tax rate. The result is analogous to the prisoners’ 
dilemma. The authors show that if a sequential structure of the game is considered and any 
country has initially to decide whether or not to discriminate and then to set the level of the tax 
rates, an equilibrium will always exist: both countries discriminate by offering a lower tax rate 
to nonresident’s income with respect to that of the residents. In equilibrium this strategy will 
allow the mobile bases to evade taxation successfully. In this sense, a discrimination strategy is 
assimilable to mobility-based competition in both enforcement policies and tax rates. If, by 
contrast, all countries harmonize their policies and decide not to discriminate, tax competition 
will lead to a lower level of tax evasion. This strategy is dominated by the one in which both 
countries discriminate and so cannot be reached in equilibrium.  
 
The literature on tax enforcement mobility-based competition, therefore, agrees on the 
impossibility of overcoming the inefficient outcome produced by auditing policies by 
implanting a harmonization policy, and, although some alternative strategies have been 
proposed, further research is needed in this field. In particular no empirical study has been 
conducted to test these models. Seen from this perspective, the case of wealth taxes seems to be 
particularly appropriate for investigation. Indeed the literature suggests that the cost of levying 
these taxes in federal systems is significantly increased by both vertical and horizontal tax 
competition (Bird, 1991). In Australia and Canada, for instance, the coexistence of a federal and 
a sub-central IGT led to the abolishment of the former (in 1978 and 1972 respectively). This 
favored the disappearance of the local IGT too which succumbed (in 1983 in Australia and in 
1986 in Canada) to the pressures of horizontal tax competition (Duff, 2005). In the U.S. the IGT 
has been repealed in 33 of the 48 contiguous states and its elimination is under discussion in the 
remaining 15. Conway & Rork (2004), drawing on historical elderly migration data, show that 
this is the result of a mobility-based competition process. The same process has occurred in the 
majority of Swiss cantons since the early 1990s. Tax competition was the main argument in the 
political debate regarding these reforms. In particular, Brülhart & Parchet (2011) find that a 
change in the IGT burden has a statistically significant effect on the very wealthy retirees’ tax 
base but not on the tax base of the retirees considered as a whole. This suggests that the 
incentive to move comes solely from the upper tail of the income distribution among retirees. 
 
The empirical evidence on wealth taxes corroborates the presence of mobility-based 
competition in statutory tax parameters but the possibility that these interactions may also occur 
at the enforcement level has yet to be investigated. From this perspective, it is also useful to 
5
relate our analysis to the literature examining the determinants of tax administration. Although 
there is no agreement as to the objective function of a tax administration, the dominant approach 
sees it as a public agency that maximizes tax revenues (e.g. Shaw et al., 2009; Slemrod & 
Yitzhaki,  2002, 1987). However, recent empirical papers suggest that political as well as 
budgetary variables play a role in determining a tax administration’s enforcement effort (see, for 
example, Young et al., 2001; Baretti et al., 2002; Esteller-Moré, 2005, 2011). 
 
In order to gain a better understanding of sub-central administration behaviour we will conduct 
an empirical analysis of the case of wealth taxes. We aim to fulfil this objective by first 
developing a simple theoretical framework that permits us to set up the basic hypotheses for 
empirical testing. 
 
3. The theoretical framework: “mobility-based” competition in presence of tax 
evasion 
Here, we consider mobility-based competition as a potential source of interdependence between 
sub-central tax administrations: we present a simple model of tax competition in the presence of 
tax evasion7. The framework is modelled as a federal state comprising two regions ( = 1,2) of 
equal size in which the total population is normalized to one. At the regional level there are two 
institutional agents: the government that sets the tax rate 	 ∈ (1, 0) and the tax administration 
that controls the auditing probability 	 ∈ (1, 0). Following the most common approach in the 
literature, we assume that both institutions act as Leviathans: they respectively set tax rates and 
auditing policies, both maximizing total tax revenues. Since we are not interested in statutory 
tax parameter interactions we do not solve the government’s problem and take tax rates as 
given. Taxpayers decide the share  ∈ (1, 0) of wealth B to declare minimizing their tax 
payment. To ensure an interior solution, tax evasion is assumed to be costly for the individual. 
Moreover, taxpayers are neutral risk-averse in order to avoid any income effects. For the sake of 
simplicity, we do not develop the individual’s problem but the results are in line with the 
standard literature (see Allingham & Sandmo 1972; Cremer & Gahvari, 2000). 
 
The model is developed in two stages: 
1. Regional tax administrations set tax auditing policies. 
2. Individuals decide in which region of the federation to locate by comparing their 
indirect utility function (based on their current tax burden) in the two regions. This 
stage is solved exploiting the concept of “home attachment” (see Mansoorian & Myers, 
                                                     
7
 The model is based on Cremer & Gahvari (2000). 
6
1993 and 1997, for the original framework and Wellisch, 2000, for a recent 
formulation). 
 
The solution is provided by backward induction. 
 
3.1 Stage 2: The decision as to which region to reside in  
To model the concept of “home” we assume that taxpayers are indexed by  ∈ (1, 0) and are 
uniformly distributed between 0 and 18. The preferences of taxpayer  with respect to his 
location are given by: 
 
() = ∗ +  × (1 − ) if  lives in region 1#∗ +  ×             if  lives in region 2 $                                                                              (1) 
 
Where 	∗ = 	∗(1 − ∗(	, 	)) for i = 1, 2, represents the (pecuniary) indirect utility function9 
and where  ∈ (1, 0) measures the non-pecuniary (psychic) benefit the individual derives from 
living in region 2 and (1 − ) the benefit from living in region 1. Thus, taxpayers indexed 
by  ∈ %0, #& reside in region 1 while those identified by  ∈ (# , 1) reside in region 2. The 
parameter  ∈ (0, + ∞) measures the degree of individual mobility. The interpretation of  is 
crucial. We assume  to represent the cost incurred when moving from the home region10. The 
taxpayer’s utility from living in his own region increases with the cost of mobility: if the costs 
are low (high) then the relative importance that the taxpayer assigns to the psychic part of the 
utility function, with respect to the pecuniary function, is low (high)11. 
The mobility equilibrium is characterized as: 
 
∗ +  × (1 − ) = #∗ +  ×  
∗ +  × (1 − ) > #∗ +  ×       ∀ <  
∗ +  × (1 − ) < #∗ +  ×       ∀ >                                                                                     (2) 
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 See Appendix 1 for a generalisation of the model that makes this assumption about the population 
distribution. 
9
 The direct utility function is defined as  = * × +1 − 	 × + + (1 − ) × , × 	- − .(1 − )-. 
Where(, − 1) > 0 is the exogenous tax penalty per unit of tax evaded and the function .(1 − ) 
represents the cost of tax evasion (1 − ), such that  .′(1 − ) > 0, .′′(1 − ) > 0, .(0) = 0, .(1) →+∞. 
10
 Since mobility could be either real or fictitious, this could be interpreted as the cost of actual mobility 
or the cost of making apparent a ficticious movement. 
11
 When the mobility cost is null ( = 0) the tax bases become perfectly mobile: only the pecuniary part 
of the utility function matters in the taxpayer’s migration decision. By contrast, when the mobility costs 
are extremely high ( → +∞) the taxpayers are perfectly immobile. This can be interpreted as a 
centralized economy case in which tax policies are set by a sole federal planner. These two limit cases are 
excluded to allow for imperfect mobility of individuals. 
7
where  =  represents the marginal individual indifferent between living in region 1 and 
region 2 and, since 0 1 = 234 , it also represents the population in region 1 in the migration 
equilibrium: 
 
 = (, , #, #; ) = 12 + 
∗ − #∗2 = 12 + * × +6# − 6 + .# − .-2                               (3) 
 
where 6	 ≡ 	 × + + (1 − ) × , × 	- is defined as the optimal effective tax rate for the 
region   = 1,2. For the sake of simplicity, the superscripts on the variables are omitted. The 
population in region 2 in the migration equilibrium is:  
 
# = 9 1 =23 1 −                                                                                                                                  (4) 
 
3.2 Stage 1: Regional administrations set tax auditing policies 
The problem is symmetric: the two administrations compete “à la Cournot” simultaneously 
setting their tax policies. We develop the problem of administration 1. Formally, administration 
1 faces the following problem given the governments’ decisions regarding tax rates and 
anticipating the results of the last stage: 
 
;<  =(, #; , #, ) =  × > = ?
12 + * ×
+6# − 6 + .# − .-2 @ × +* × 6 − 1()- 
 
where 1(	) represents the tax administration cost such that 1′() > 0, 1()′′ > 0 and 
 >	 ≡ AB2B = +* × 6	 − 1(	) - is the unitary tax revenue. 
 
Since the two regions are symmetric, we can show that a symmetric Nash equilibrium exists, 
satisfying the following condition obtained from the first order condition (FOC) of the 
administrations imposing   = # = ,   = # = : 
 
:     >D′ = −2′D × > > 0                                                                                                                          (5) 
 
The factor −2′D represents the expected loss in the number of taxpayers due to an increase 
in . So the right-hand side of equation (5) corresponds to the marginal mobility costs for the 
regional administrations in terms of tax revenue losses due to an increase in . The left-hand 
side represents the net marginal revenue due to an increase in . 
8
By developing condition (5) we find that * × FGFD − 1′() = > × H×%
IJIKLIMIK&N . This shows us 
immediately that in the limit case of centralization ( → +∞), the marginal mobility costs are 
null and that >D′ =  0: we are at the bliss point of the Laffer curve. Since the marginal mobility 
costs are positive, under decentralization ( ∈ (0, + ∞)) the tax auditing implementation is 
more costly. In fact, the net marginal tax revenue is positive (>D′ > 0) and tax enforcement is 
less severe than under centralisation: the threat of the mobility of the tax base tames the 
administration. This result replicates that reported by Cremer and Ghavari (2000). 
 
3.3 The slope of the reaction function and other comparative statics 
Since the purpose of this paper is to test empirically the presence of regional interdependence in 
the setting of tax auditing policies, we wish to examine the process by which regional 
administrations reach the equilibrium level of auditing probability. In other words, we are 
interested in evaluating the slope of the reaction function 	(O). A non-null sign would 
highlight the presence of some kind of interaction between regions. It is easy to show that: 
 
PP# = −
=D3DQ(, #; , #, )=D3D3(, #; , #, ) =   −
DQ × >D3=D3D3(, #; , #, ) > 0                                              (6) 
 
The first term in the numerator of equation (6) represents the derivative of the population in 
region 1 with respect to the enforcement of region 2 and is positive: once region 2 begins to 
increase its auditing probability, some residents in region 2 will start to move to region 1. The 
second factor in the numerator represents the marginal unitary tax revenue that is positive under 
the FOC. According to the second order condition (SOC) of the administration’s problem the 
denominator in equation (6) should be negative. The slope of the reaction function is then 
positive: the regional administrations set their auditing strategies in a complementary fashion 
and so they are competing over this instrument in order to attract (or at least not to lose) their 
tax base. We test this result by means of econometric techniques. Our main research question 
can therefore be stated as follows: to what extent does the auditing policy of each region depend 
on the strategies adopted by the other regions? Moreover, it is possible to show that  F%IK3IKQ&FN < 0 
(see Appendix 2 for details). This means that the competition between regions weakens as the 
mobility costs rise. Since it seems reasonable to assume that mobility costs will be positively 
correlated with the distance between regions, two distant regions will compete less than two 
regions that lie closer together. We explicitly take this into consideration when choosing the 
econometric strategy. 
 
9
A further result we find and test is that  and # are strategic complements, in fact: 
 
PP# = −
=D3SQ(, #; , #, )=D3D3(, #; , #, ) = −
SQ × >D3=D3D3(, #; , #, ) > 0                                                (7) 
 
This result is reasonable: if the government in one region increases competition in tax rates (i.e. 
it reduces O), ceteris paribus, the administration in the other region will unambiguously react by 
setting a more tolerant auditing rate (i.e. it reduces 	) in order not to lose any tax base12. 
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
In this section we test the main hypothesis by means of an econometric model, we provide a 
description of the data base and we present and comment on the main results emerging from the 
analysis. 
 
4.1 The empirical framework 
The theoretical framework presented in the previous section offers interesting insights that 
require empirical testing: the horizontal tax competition model suggests that revenue- 
maximizing administrations set their auditing policies in a complementary fashion, interacting 
so as not to lose tax bases. This result can be derived from equation (6). To test it we estimate a 
time-space recursive model that adopts a spatial econometric specification (see Anselin et al. 
2008). 
 
4.1.1 Time-space recursive model 
The recent literature on horizontal tax interdependence acknowledges the possibility that policy 
reactions are not immediate and the need for inertia to be considered when setting statutory tax 
parameters (e.g. Overesch & Rincke, 2011). Moreover, since tax enforcement policy is not 
expected to change radically from one year to the next, we consider the possibility that a 
sluggish adjustment in auditing policies might play an even stronger role in our case. Thus, we 
build a dynamic time-space recursive model (Anselin et al. 2008), introducing the time-lagged 
endogenous variable as a regressor, in addition to the lagged spatial regressor: 
 
	S = U	 + ,S + 	SV + WV	SV + XY=	S + Z[\	S + ]^_`	S + abcdef	S + gc_`.1e	S   
+ hY>i`_<e	S + jd>`_	S + lc_1	S + mc_1V	SV + n	S                            (8) 
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 Unfortunately it is not possible to unambiguously determine the sign of the slope of  (). 
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So the coefficient α accounts for the presence of inertia and is expected to be positive (i.e. the 
higher the value, the stronger the inertia) and less than one to be congruent with the concept of 
Nash equilibrium. 	S represents the total number of audits performed by region  during the 
year , while the term V	SV ≡ ∑ q	OrOs  OSV is the spatial lag of the endogenous variable and 
q	O is the spatial weight that describes the relative interdependence of regions  and t in such a 
way that q	O ≥ 0 if  ≠ t and q	O = 0 if   = t. Specifically, we employ a spatial matrix based 
on the inverse of the distance between regional capitals. The choice is made on the basis of the 
results of the theoretical model: when the distance between two regions – a proxy of mobility 
costs – increases we observe a lower level of competition in terms of their auditing policies13. 
Since the number of audits performed depends on the total number of auditable tax forms 
received in any one year, we introduce the number of tax returns received by region  during the 
year  (Y=	S) in the regression, in this way we control for the size of the tax administration. The 
specification includes fixed effects for regions U	 and years ,S, while n	S is the error term. 
 
So the term  V	SV accounts for potential strategic competition in auditing policies and it is 
introduced with a time lag because in practice the tax auditing policies of the other regions are 
not simultaneously observable by a regional administration14. If coefficient W differs 
significantly from zero, the model will predict the presence of regional interactions in the setting 
of tax auditing policies. More specifically, according to the theoretical framework, eq. (6), we 
expect W to be positive.  
 
We assume the size of the tax administration to be optimal when the increase in the number of 
tax returns corresponds to an exactly proportional increase in the number of audits, in the sense 
that the audited share of the tax returns remains unchanged, which corresponds to X being equal 
to one. Tax administration policies might be sensitive to “budgetary” and “political” effects (see 
e.g. Esteller-Moré, 2005, 2011), as well as to other elements for which we control. [\	S, a 
dummy variable equal to one if there is an election in region  during the year , is introduced to 
control for the electoral cycle. ^_`	S is another dummy equal to one if the party in office in a 
specific region and year is to the left of the political spectrum. We use per capita GDP 
(.1eef	S) to control for the regional economic cycle and regional size. The deficit-GDP ratio 
(1_`.1e	S) and the total amount of transfers received from the central government divided by 
                                                     
13
 While the recent literature suggests that a change in the spatial matrix is not crucial (LeSage & Pace 
2010), in our case the model can be assumed to be better specified than one based on a simple natural 
neighbors matrix because the Spanish state includes a number of islands, the presence of which makes the 
definition of neighbors arbitrary (see, for example, Costa-Font & Pons-Novell, 2007). 
14
 This methodology has been used in several empirical papers dealing with tax rate interactions. See e.g. 
Fredriksson & Millimet (2002); Fredriksson et al. (2004); Millimet & Rangaprasad (2007). 
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total regional expenditure (>i`_<e	S) are introduced to account for further relevant 
budgetary factors. We also control for a proxy of profitability (e>`_	S) defined as the mean 
revenue per audit collected by a region in a specific year. To account for possible normative 
modifications to the statutory tax parameters, we include a dummy (1_1	S) equal to one if the 
regional government  makes a marked deduction in favour of the most common heirs during 
the year 15. These modifications to the deduction regime substantially reduce the level of the 
effective tax rate and there is evidence that they induce a convergence process among regions 
congruent with a race to the bottom (Durán-Cabré & Esteller-Moré 2009, 2010). We can then 
interpret a  1_1	S  value equal to 1 as a modification to the corresponding regional statutory tax 
parameters that results in a less severe effective tax rate. Finally, we control for  1_1V	SV, 
which represents the weighted average of the neighbours’ deduction policies in the previous 
year. In line with the above reasoning, an increase in this variable is compatible with a decrease 
in the lagged weighted average of the neighbours’ statutory tax parameters. According to the 
theoretical model (equation (7)), we expect the coefficient of this variable to be negative: a 
1_1V	SV value equal to 1 (i.e. a decrease in # in the equation (7)) would correspond to a 
decreasing number of audits. 
 
As is well known, the lagged endogenous variable 	SV is by definition positively correlated 
with the regional fixed effect U	. This implies that estimating α by means of OLS will lead to 
inefficient and upward biased estimates. The within-groups estimator eliminates this source of 
inconsistency by transforming the equation to eliminate U	 but it results in an estimator that is 
downward biased (see Nickell, 1981). As suggested by Bond (2002, pag. 4) “a candidate 
consistent estimator will lie between the OLS and within-group estimates” and the Generalized 
Methods of Moments (GMM) provides a convenient framework for obtaining it. Specifically, 
we employ an augmented version of the Difference GMM (Arellano and Bond, 1991), the so-
called System GMM estimator (Arellano and Bover, 1995), which is supposed to be more 
efficient (Blundell and Bond, 1998). This estimator applies a transformation to the original 
model taking the first differences in order to eliminate  U	 and builds a stacked dataset with 
variables in levels and in differences. The equation in differences is then instrumented with lags 
2 and up of the endogenous variables in levels while the equation in levels is instrumented using 
the same lags of the endogenous variable in differences. 
 
According to Ziliak (1997), instrumenting the lagged endogenous variable with all the available 
lags is efficient, but in small samples it might cause an over-fitting bias in the GMM estimators. 
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 The main heirs are the spouse, any descendant younger than 21 years or ascendants. For details on the 
normative aspect of the exemption regime see Durán-Cabré and Esteller-Moré (2009, 2010). 
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To overcome this, Roodman (2009) suggests reducing the instrument count, seeking to keep the 
number of instruments below that of the groups. We combine both possible approaches for 
containing instruments: collapsing instruments and limiting lag depth amounts (see Roodman, 
2009, pp. 148-151, for more details on these techniques). Although the number of instruments is 
significantly reduced it is still larger than the relatively small number of groups, so we are 
unable to rectify this problem completely. In order to test the instruments validity we perform 
the Hansen and Sargan tests of overidentifying restrictions, even though their performance is 
likely to be weakened by the high number of instruments. 
 
To verify the validity of the instruments we also need to check for the absence of serially 
correlated error terms, which is a required condition for the consistency of the GMM estimator. 
We perform tests for first (AR(1)) and second order (AR(2)) serial correlation under the null 
hypothesis of the presence of serial correlation. If there is no serial correlation in n	S, the first-
differenced residuals should reject the null hypothesis in the AR(1) test but not in the AR(2) test 
(Arellano and Bond, 1991). 
 
As for the estimation strategy of V	SV, we employ System GMM using the lags of the spatial 
lag as instruments (reported as internal), but we also provide a robustness check by adding 
external instruments16 to determine the extent to which the estimates are affected by the use of 
both sets of instruments. 
 
Finally, we enrich the model in order to gain a better understanding of the extent to which the 
reforms first implemented in Spain in the mid-nineties have affected the horizontal 
interdependence in tax auditing. More specifically, to test whether V	SV is affected by the 
decentralization process that gave greater tax legislative power to the regional governments, we 
interact V	SV with ewi97	S, a dummy equal to one for years posterior to the first IGT reform 
(1997). In this way we identify the effect of the devolution process as a whole. In order to 
disentangle the specific role of either one of the two reforms, we interact V	SV with a dummy 
that identifies the second reform (2002) and, in the same model, with another dummy associated 
with the period between the two reforms. Finally, we introduce one last model where V	SV is 
interacted with 1_1	S. The aim in this case is to emphasize the effects of the actual 
implementation of the second IGT reform on the process of enforcement competition. 
 
                                                     
16
 We use some (lagged) exogenous explanatory variables as instruments, employing the same weighting 
scheme for the instruments as with V	SV (see e.g. Kelejian & Robinson, 1993; Kelejian & Prucha, 
1998). 
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If the coefficients of these alternative interaction terms are found to be negative, then it would 
mean that following the reforms that gradually decentralized legislative power vis-à-vis 
statutory tax parameters, the regions reduced competition in their auditing policies. In other 
words: a reduction in opaque competition in the enforcement strategies would be the result of 
the possibility to compete in statutory tax parameters. 
 
4.1.2 Data and Sources 
Our panel comprises information about the 15 Spanish “common regime” Autonomous 
Communities17 for the period 1987-200918. In Table 1 we present the summary statistics. 
Information about regional tax enforcement policies is released annually within the tax 
assignment report, “Informe sobre la cesión de tributos a las Comunidades Autónomas”, 
published together with the Spanish National Budget, “Proyecto de Presupuestos Generales del 
Estado”. The report registers the number of audits performed on a yearly basis by each region. 
We use this information to define our endogenous variable 	S together with the number of tax 
returns (Y=	S) and the proxy of auditing profitability (e>`_	S). The other variables are 
obtained from the following statistical sources. The per capita GDP (.1eef	S) is provided by 
the Spanish National Institute of Statistics (INE). The deficit data used to construct the variable 
1_`.1e	S are calculated as the difference between current availability and current expenditure 
as provided by the database maintained by the Ministry of Economy and Finance. The 
>i`_<e	S is constructed as the ratio between the total amount of transfers received from the 
central government (extracted from the INE database) and the total regional expenditure 
(extracted from the Ministry of Economy and Finance database). The information on election 
years _\	S  is obtained from the Interior Ministry’s website 
(http://www.mir.es/DGPI/Elecciones/Procesos_Electorales_Celebrados/proceso_por_tipoyfecha
.html) while the information about the political colour of each regional government, required to 
construct the dummy \_`	S, is obtained from Zarate’s Political Collections website 
(http://www.terra.es/personal2/monolith). The information used to construct the dummy 1_1	S, 
which accounts for the introduction of IGT deductions, is taken from Durán-Cabré & Esteller-
Moré (2009). 
 
[TABLE 1] 
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 The Communities of Navarre and the Basque Country form part of the Foral System, which grants 
them independence in their laws and tax administrations. For this reason information about them is not 
available and they are not included in the paper. 
18
 We do not have any information about administration policies in 1993 as in 1995 the budget was not 
approved and data about ceded taxes is two-year lagged. Auditing information for the Madrid Community 
becomes available in 1996, the year in which it was granted this administrative power. 
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4.2 Basic results 
In Table 2 we report the results of the time-space recursive model expressed in equation (8). 
Column (1) is a baseline estimation testing auditing interactions without accounting for inertia 
(i.e. assuming  = 0 in equation 8)19. The autoregressive coefficient is significant and positive: 
this is congruent with the theoretical model although the coefficient is not credible because it is 
much higher than one, which is not compatible with the Nash equilibrium. Moreover, even 
though there are no studies in the literature specifically analyzing these issues with which we 
can compare our estimates, the literature on spatial interactions in the setting of statutory tax 
parameters suggests that the slope of the reaction function should be quite a lot lower20. Thus, it 
seems that not taking into account the inertia leads to a misspecification of the model: 
otherwise, its role is picked up by the spatial lag. 
 
In columns (2) to (5) we present the basic model without interactions finding that inertia plays 
an important role in the setting of regional auditing policies: the coefficients are strongly 
significant and positive21. In any model the coefficient of the spatial lag is positive and 
significant, which confirms that horizontal interactions between regional administrations do take 
place when setting the auditing policies. This, in turn, is congruent with the hypothesis of tax 
competition adopted in the theoretical model. More precisely the spatial lag coefficient is within 
the range (0.38 – 0.66) depending on which controls are introduced and which instruments are 
employed. Even if there is no benchmark in the literature against which to compare these 
results, the values are much more credible than those obtained without accounting for sluggish 
adjustments in the endogenous variable. In column (5) we specifically exploit both internal and 
external instruments and it can be seen that this does not make much difference to the results for 
the estimates of inertia and horizontal interactions. 
 
If we consider the controls, three robust results can be highlighted. First, the variable “election 
year” is significant and negatively associated with the setting of auditing policies: in the 
presence of an election regional administrations reduce their enforcement of the IGT. This 
suggests that there is a political link between regional governments and regional tax 
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 This is a pure-space recursive model estimated using a two-stage least square procedure. We employed 
the external instruments only. We report an endogeneity test of  V	SV (under the null hypothesis that the 
regressor can actually be treated as exogenous), we perform Hansen’s (1982) overidentifying restrictions 
test and, finally, we report the first-stage F-statistic to check the performance and the potential weakness 
of the instruments. 
20
 They should be around 0.2 – 0.35 according to Revelli, (2001, 2006). 
21
 The coefficients of the lagged endogenous variable are fairly high but lower than those obtained 
through the OLS estimator (around 0.96) and higher than those obtained through the within group 
estimator (around 0.83). As such they are within the range indicated by Bond (2002) to contain a 
consistent estimator. Moreover, note that AR(1) and AR(2) tests detect first order but not second order 
serial correlation for first-differenced residuals. 
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administrations. Politicians in office have an incentive to reduce the effective IGT rate in order 
to gain votes and re-election and to operate through the tax administration, whose reduction of 
enforcement policies complies with politicians’ objectives. The second robust result concerns 
the variable 1_1	S, which accounts for the introduction of IGT deductions by the regional 
governments. This variable is significant and positively associated with the enforcement 
strategies of the regional administrations. This suggests that once the governments are entitled 
to modify the statutory tax parameters (i.e. after the 2002 reform) and opt to make generous 
deductions, the administrations increase the number of audits: statutory tax parameters and 
auditing policies are strategic substitutes. Finally, the coefficient of the term 1_1V	SV is 
negative and significant corroborating the result of the theoretical framework (equation 7): 
neighbours’ statutory tax parameters and auditing policies are strategic complements. 
 
[TABLE 2] 
4.3 Further results 
In Table 3 we perform various interactions. In the first regression we interact V	SV with a 
dummy that captures the effect of the first major IGT reform introduced in 1997 and obtain a 
negative and significant coefficient for the interacted term. This reform seems to have a 
negative effect on the enforcement strategies of the administrations. Moreover, the absolute 
values of the two coefficients (interacted and uninteracted) are fairly similar and, in fact, if we 
inspect the linear combination between them we find that the total effect is clearly not 
significantly different from zero22. This result can be interpreted as a corroboration of the 
hypothesis of horizontal tax competition as a source of auditing interdependence. In particular, 
this analysis seems to suggest that during the period in which legislative authority over the IGT 
was decentralized, competition in enforcement policies disappeared and switched to the setting 
of statutory tax parameters.  
 
This result implicitly provides a mechanism for eluding what Cremer and Ghavari (2000) 
consider the unfeasibility of harmonization policies for enforcement strategies. As discussed in 
Section 2, their argument is that a coordinated strategy between sub-central administrations is 
unattainable because of the difficulties in establishing whether a specific region’s enforcement 
effort is adequate or not23. This leads to an unavoidable inefficient enforcement outcome. Our 
result seems to suggest that the devolution process can play a crucial role. Decentralizing the 
legislative power on statutory tax parameters has the positive and welcoming effect of a switch 
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 The coefficient is -0.042 and the t-statistic -0.25. 
23
 In fact, for instance, a low auditing rate could be identified as inefficient simply because it is low while 
it is actually low as a result of an improvement process that ensured that enforcement effort was much 
more precise and efficient. 
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from opaque tax competition in tax enforcement to more transparent competition in the setting 
of statutory tax parameters, which makes a harmonization policy more feasible. To improve the 
specification of this aspect, in column (2) we interact – in the same regression –  V	SV with the 
dummies that identify respectively, the second wave of reform and the period between the two 
reforms. In this way we can disentangle the specific effects of each reform. We obtain 
analogous results but in this case, although both interacted terms are negative, the term 
identifying the second reform presents a lower absolute value that is not significant24. This 
means that the first wave of reform had a stronger negative impact on auditing competition. We 
interpret this result as evidence that to observe a substantial disappearance of competition in 
enforcement strategies, it is sufficient for the regions to have the possibility to weakly set (and 
compete over) statutory tax parameters25. This last result is also corroborated by interacting 
V	SV with the dummy that identifies the actual implementation of a substantial reduction in the 
statutory tax parameters (1_1	S): the interacted term is also negative and although it is not 
significant, the linear combination between the interacted and uninteracted terms is not 
significantly different from zero. 
 
[TABLE 3] 
 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper we have analyzed the presence of another level of tax interdependence that may 
occur in federal contexts: horizontal competition between regional administrations in their 
enforcement policies. By applying a theoretical framework we derive a regional auditing 
reaction function that is positively sloped: regional administrations compete in their auditing 
policies. This result is tested by means of spatial econometric techniques. The time-space 
recursive model produces outcomes that corroborate the theory. Specifically, allowing for 
sluggish adjustment we obtain a high degree of inertia in the auditing policy setting and 
coefficients for the spatial lag (around 0.38 – 0.66) which are congruent with the Nash 
equilibrium condition. This is our main contribution, which is in line with Cremer and 
Gahvari’s results (2000).  
 
These authors suggest that in the presence of horizontal competition, as auditing strategies are 
not publicly or easily observable, it might prove difficult to set a binding agreement between 
sub-central governments that is aimed at harmonizing these strategies. This is a reasonable point 
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 The linear combination of the two effects with the uninteracted term is still not significant: the 
coefficient is -0.262 and the t-statistic is -0.67. 
25
 This could also simply depend on the fact that the observations involved in the evaluation of the second 
and more recent wave of reform were fewer. 
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in the sense that even if the policies are publicly observable (because, for instance, they are 
recorded in a publicly available report – as is the case in Spain), it might not be readily 
established whether a specific region’s enforcement effort is sufficient or not. As regards this 
point, here we implicitly find a way of circumventing this problem. Our empirical evidence 
suggests that if the decentralization process is gradually implemented and administrative 
responsibility is decentralized before the normative power, enforcement policy competition 
disappears in the precise moment when it is possible to compete in terms of more powerful 
instruments, i.e. the statutory tax parameters. Seen from this perspective, the decentralization 
process is welcome: a highly decentralized framework has the advantage of switch from a 
situation of opaque competition to a situation of transparent competition. 
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TABLES: 
 
Table 1: Summary statistics 
Variable Observations  Mean Median SD Max Min 
Audits 307 370.5961 195 486.5621 2550 0 
Tax Returns 308 21187 13442 18234.62 88528 1641 
Leftish government 322 0.4627329 0 0.4993853 1 0 
Election year 322 0.2546584 0 0.4363471 1 0 
Deduction 322 0.1335404 0 0.3406872 1 0 
Deficit-GDP ratio 308 -0.0028976 -0.0017705 0.0070989 0.0298811 -0.026144 
Transfers-GDP ratio 294 0.3977149 0.3853665 0.1348314 1.373906 0.1117062 
Per Capita GDP 322 11.52553 11.35349 5.497171 23.01702 2.174576 
Auditing Profitability 280 8.936545 4.650814 12.75857 108.2774 0 
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Table 2: Tax Auditing interdependence: Time-space recursive model 
(System-GMM/One-step; Fixed effects & Time Effects in all specifications) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Audits Audits Audits Audits Audits 
L.audits - 0.912*** 0.888*** 0.896*** 0.932*** 
  (5.969) (6.265) (6.733) (8.989) 
L.Waudits 2.114* 0.659** 0.521** 0.381* 0.468** 
 (1.718) (2.205) (2.214) (1.685) (2.329) 
Leftish government -233.735** -53.907 -34.527 -3.522 -4.096 
 (-2.193) (-0.982) (-0.804) (-0.170) (-0.208) 
Election year -101.380 -34.505** -37.684** -33.477** -33.315** 
 (-1.102) (-2.254) (-2.210) (-2.158) (-2.114) 
Deficit/GDP 5740.946 -270.497 27.531 137.939 -393.251 
 (1.061) (-0.141) (0.014) (0.067) (-0.180) 
Transfers/expenditure -130.466 226.583 233.558 225.265 252.761 
 (-0.530) (1.136) (1.168) (1.219) (1.410) 
Tax Return -0.001 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 
 (-0.108) (1.421) (1.486) (1.041) (1.027) 
Deduction   76.970** 59.932*** 49.657*** 
   (2.307) (2.724) (2.774) 
L.WDeduction   -168.552* -271.726** -332.964*** 
   (-1.726) (-2.226) (-2.748) 
Per capita GDP    4.151 9.031 
    (0.324) (1.007) 
L.audit_profitability    -0.418 -0.490 
    (-0.316) (-0.372) 
Tax Return×d_foral    0.004 0.004 
    (1.147) (1.136) 
_cons  -211.897* -175.954 -195.919 -279.633 
  (-1.671) (-1.187) (-0.678) (-1.170) 
Observations 237 237 237 237 237 
Internal Instruments NO YES YES YES YES 
External Instruments YES NO NO NO YES 
# Instruments 5 32 34 37 40 
Gmm lag limits - (2, 5) (2, 5) (2, 5) (2, 5) 
AR(1) (p-value) - 0.039 0.040 0.037 0.026 
AR(2) (p-value) - 0.987 0.951 0.981 0.964 
Sargan-test - 8.673 8.126 9.008 13.533 
Sargan-test (p-value) - 0.371 0.421 0.342 0.260 
Hansen-test 2.105 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Hansen-test (p-value) 0.716 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Endogeneity-test 10.864 - - - - 
Endogeneity-test 
 (p-value) 
0.001 - - - - 
First stage F-statistic 54.46 - - - - 
First stage F-statistic (p-
value) 
0.0000 - - - - 
Note: t statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Model (1) is a pure-space recursive model estimated through 
a 2SLS procedure. 
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Table 3: Tax Auditing interdependence: Time-space recursive model – Interactions 
(System-GMM/One-step; Fixed effects & Time Effects in all specifications) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Audits Audits Audits 
L.audits 0.879*** 0.869*** 0.904*** 
 (10.933) (13.432) (6.721) 
L.Waudits 0.641** 0.688*** 0.398* 
 (2.540) (2.667) (1.818) 
L.Waudits×post97 -0.683***   
 (-3.458)   
L.Waudits×D97-01  -0.716***  
  (-3.337)  
L.Waudits×post01  -0.235  
  (-0.849)  
L.Waudits×deduction   -0.530 
   (-1.052) 
Leftish government -4.669 -4.895 -3.485 
 (-0.264) (-0.230) (-0.163) 
Election year -27.053* -31.638* -37.983** 
 (-1.655) (-1.815) (-1.996) 
Deficit/GDP -319.061 -763.501 26.451 
 (-0.152) (-0.354) (0.012) 
Transfers/expenditure 218.924 208.353 232.217 
 (1.156) (1.078) (1.271) 
Tax Return 0.002 0.003 0.002 
 (1.232) (1.589) (0.964) 
Deduction 44.531*** 72.272*** 91.448** 
 (2.960) (3.483) (2.185) 
L.WDeduction -198.526 -278.812* -341.017*** 
 (-1.487) (-1.834) (-3.060) 
Per capita GDP -4.910 -1.843 5.686 
 (-0.758) (-0.220) (0.446) 
L.audit_profitability -0.113 -0.158 -0.425 
 (-0.095) (-0.134) (-0.307) 
Tax Return×d_foral 0.003 0.004* 0.004 
 (1.227) (1.688) (1.117) 
_cons 36.460 -105.899 -197.627 
 (0.170) (-0.396) (-0.689) 
Observations 237 237 237 
Internal Instruments YES YES YES 
External Instruments NO NO NO 
# Instruments 42 45 40 
Gmm lag limits (2, 5) (2, 5) (2, 5) 
AR(1) (p-value) 0.017 0.017 0.036 
AR(2) (p-value) 0.985 0.946 0.922 
Sargan-test 14.496 14.704 9.126 
Sargan-test (p-value) 0.270 0.399 0.520 
Hansen-test 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Hansen-test (p-value) 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Note: t statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Appendix 1: Generalized results with non uniform distribution of taxpayers 
Now we assume that the distribution of taxpayers along the home attachment is not uniform, i.e. 
we assume that   y (0,1)~`() where `() represents a generic density function.  
The value (, , #, #; ) = # + {3∗V{Q∗#N  represents the marginal individual indifferent 
between living in region 1 and region 2. Below  we have all the taxpayers that settle in region 
1, while above  there are all the taxpayers that live in region 2. The respective shares of each 
group are |() = 0 `()1234  and 1 − |() = 0 `()123 . 
At stage 1 the problem of the administration of region 1 becomes: 
 
;<  = = |() × > = |() × +* × 6 − 1()-                   
 
The FOC of this problem is:  
 
′D3 × `() × > + >~D3 × |() ≡ d(, #; , #, ) = 0 
 
The SOC is: 
 
dD3(, #; , #, ) < 0 
 
The slope of the reaction function becomes: 
 
PP# = −
dDQ(, #; , #, )dD3(, #; , #, ) 
 
That is positive as long as `′() ≤ 0 26. 
 
Appendix 2: Comparative statics on   
It is possible to express FD3FDQ as a function of  in order to perform a comparative statics analysis: 
 
PP# = −

 +  × P#>P#
= − × ? +  × P#>P#@
V                                                                      
                                                     
26
 This condition is satisfied if the median of the population distribution () coincide with or is higher 
than the mode of the distribution. This condition can usually be satisfied. 
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Where:  
 
 = −2* × P6P +
P.P × * ×
P6P − 1′() + * × +6# − 6 + .# − .-
× * × P#6P# − 1′′() − +* × 6 − 1()- × * × 
P#6#P# +
P#.#P# 
 
And 
 
 = * × P6#P# +
P.#P# × * ×
P6P − 1′()   
 
So that under FOC and SOC results  > 0 and: 
 
P PP#P = ? +  × P#>P#@
# × P
#>P# < 0 
 
Appendix 3: Interdependence of different instruments 
The derivative FD3FDQ  with respect to # could be written as: 
 
P PP#P# =
−=D3DQSQ × =D3D3 + =D3D3SQ × =D3DQ
%=D3D3&#
 
 
This is positive as long as: 
 
; ≡ =D3D3SQ × =D3DQ − =D3DQSQ × =D3D3 > 0 ⇔   =D3D3SQ × =D3DQ > =D3DQSQ × =D3D3 
 
Where: 
=D3D3SQ = F23FSQ × F
Q3FD3Q < 0, 
=D3D3 = 2 F23FD3 × F3FD3 +  × F
Q3FD3Q + > × F
Q23FD3Q < 0 under the SOC; 
=D3DQSQ = FQ23FDQSQ × F3FD3 > 0 under FOC; 
=D3DQ = F23FSQ × F3FD3 > 0 under FOC. 
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So, in general, it is not possible to establish an unambiguous relationship between FD3FDQ and #.  
The same results hold for the relationship between FD3FDQ and . 
 
Appendix 4: Derivatives computation 
It is possible to show that: 
P∗	P	 =
P∗(	, 	)P	 =
−(1 − 	 × ,).′′ < 0 
P∗	P	 =
P∗(	, 	)P	 =
	,.′′ > 0 
P6	∗P	 = ∗	 + (1 − ∗	) × 	 × , +
P∗	P	 × (1 − 	 × ,) × 	<>0 
P6	∗P	 = (1 − ∗	) × 	 × , +
P∗	P	 (1 − 	 × ,) × 	 > 0 P.	P	 = −
P∗	P	 (1 − 	 × ,) × 	 > 0 P.	P	 = −
P∗	P	 (1 − 	 × ,) × 	 < 0 
P6	∗P	 +
P.	P	  = ∗	 + (1 − ∗	) × 	 × , > 0 
P6	∗P	 +
P.	P	 = (1 − ∗	) × 	 × , > 0 
PP = −
* × P6P + P.P2 < 0 
PP# =
* × P6#P# + P.#P#2 > 0 
PP = −
* × P6P + P.P 2 < 0 
PP# =
* × P6#P# + P.#P# 2 > 0 
P>P = * ×
P6P − 1~() <>0 P>P = * ×
P6P  <>0 
P#∗(	, 	)P	# =
P∗P	 × , × 	(.′′)# × .~~~ ≤ 0    ``     .~~~ ≤ 0  
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P#∗(	, 	)P	# =
P∗P	 × (1 − 	 × ,)(.′′)# × .~~~ ≤ 0    ``     .~~~ ≥ 0  
We assume .~~~ = 0. 
 
P#6	∗P	# =  
P∗P	 × 2 × (1 − 	 × ,) +
P#∗P	# (1 − 	 × ,) × 	 < 0     ``     .~~~ = 0  
P#6	∗P	# = −2 ×
P∗P	 × , × 	 +
P#∗
P	# (1 − 	 × ,) × 	 < 0         ``     .~~~ = 0  
P#>P# = * ×
P#6P# − 1~~() < 0   ``     .′′′ = 0  
P#>P# = * ×
P#6P#  < 0     ``     .′′′ = 0   
P#.	P	# = −
P#∗P	# (1 − 	 × ,) × 	 −
P∗P	 (1 − 	 × ,) > 0 
P#.	P	# = −
P#∗
P	# (1 − 	 × ,) × 	 +
P∗P	 × , × 	 > 0 
P#6	∗P	# +
P#.	P	#  =  
P∗P	 × (1 − 	 × ,) < 0 
P#6	∗P	# +
P#.	P	# = −
P∗P	 × , × 	 < 0 
P#P# = −
* × P#6#P# +
P#.#P#2 > 0 
P#P# = −
* × P#6#P# + P
#.#P# 2 > 0 
P#PP = −
*2 ×  P
#6	∗P	P	 +
P#.	P	P	 = −
*2 × (1 − ∗) × , − P
∗
P	 × , × 	 < 0 
P#>PP = * ×
P#6PP > 0 
P#PP = −
*2 ×  P
#6	∗P	P	 +
P#.	P	P	 = −
*2 × P
∗
P	 × (1 − 	 × ,) + (1 − ∗) × , < 0 
P#>PP = * ×
P#6PP > 0 
P>P# =
P#>PP# =
P#PP# =
P#P#P =
P>P# =
P#>PP# =
P#PP# =
P#P#P =
P#PP# = 0 
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